D. W. Nichol v. Henning Wall, Virginia Wall : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1952
D. W. Nichol v. Henning Wall, Virginia Wall : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Critchlow, Watson & Warnock; Attorneys for Appellee;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Nichol v. Wall, No. 7881 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1793
(~ 
/ 
\ 
J 
Case No. 7881 
IN THE SUPREI\m COURT 
of --the 
STATE OF UTAH 
.D. W. NICHOL, 
· Plaintiff anil Respo'lli/,et&t, 
-va.-
'JJENNING WALL, 
. DefenJ,a·nt and .tl. ppellarnt. 
·ymGINIA WALL, 
) ..... t Defendant. 
BRIEF ·oF RESPONDENT 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
PAGE 
S ta temen t of F'acts______________________________________________________________ 1-2 
Statement of Point Relied Upon-
The Court was not bound by Appellant's testi-
mony, but could properly find the reasonable 
measure of rentaL______________________________________________________ 3 
Argm11ent ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3-7 
Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
Authorities Cited-
Boston Insurance Co. v. Read, ( C.C.A. lOth), 
166 Fed. ( 2d) 55L___________________________________________________ 7 
Head v. Hargrave, 105 U.S. 45; 26 L. ed. 1028. _____ 4-5 
Hirabelli v. Daniels, 44 Utah 88; 138 Pac. 1172.... 4 
Richard & Gilbert Co. v. Northwestern Natural 
Gas Corp., 16 Wash. 2d 631; 134 Pac. 2d 444____ 7 
The Conqueror, 166 U.S.llO; 41 L. ed. 937____________ 5 
American Juris prudence, Vol. 20, pp. 1059-60______ 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
D. \Y. XICHOL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-YS.-
HE~NIKG vVALL, Case No. 7881 
Defendant and Appellarnt. 
VIRGINIA WALL, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The appellant in his statement of facts has correctly 
stated that the only question before this court concerns 
the evidence relative to the reasonable rental value of a 
chain saw and the finding of the trial court that $100.00 
was a reasonable rental. 
The plaintiff sued for the reasonable value of serv-
ices and materials. The defendant answered and counter-
claimed, alleging certain offsets. The plaintiff admitted 
all of the offsets except the rental charged in the sum of 
$680.00 for the chain saw for a period from September 
20th to October 29th, 1948. The undisputed testimony of 
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both parties was to the effect that no rental was agreed 
upon (R. 22 and 54). The burden was on the defendant 
to prove the reasonable rental of the chain saw. 
The chain saw was purchased for the sum of $659.00 
new (R. 53). 
The only knowledge the appellee had relative to the 
rental of chain saws is found in the following excerpts 
from the transcript (R. page 46) : 
"The fellows I worked with cutting timber 
up there charged $20.00 a day when they swapped 
saws between them when they would break one of 
their saws." 
and R. page 4 7-48 : 
Q. "~1r. Wall, did you at any time rent a chain 
saw~ 
A. "To Mr. Nichol. 
Q. "Did you rent one from someone else~ 
A. "I wasn't a'ble to get one. 
Q. "And did you ever rent your chain saw to any-
one other than Mr. Nichol~ 
A. "There was one tree man I let have it. 
Q. "When was that~ 
A. "1949, $20.00. 
Q. "That was one day~ 
A. "Yes. 
Q. "Where~ 
A. "Here in Salt Lake. 
Q. "Who was the man you rented it to~ 
A. "My brother." 
This is the sum total of the appellant's experience 
with the rental of chain saws except that they were not 
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available. \Yhen the appellant was asked his opinion as 
to the reasonable rental the question was objected to on 
the ground it called for a conclusion and no proper found-
ation 1nade and the objection was overruled (R. page 48). 
STATE:JIEKT OF POINT RELIED UPON 
A. THE COURT WAS NOT BOUND BY APPELLANT'S 
TESTil\IONY, BUT COULD PROPERLY FIND THE REASON-
ABLE MEASURE OF RENTAL. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE COURT WAS NOT BOUND BY APPELLANT'S 
TESTIMONY, BUT COULD PROPERLY FIND THE REASON-
ABLE MEASURE OF RENTAL. 
We take no issue with appellant regarding the power 
of a court generally to make a finding not supported by 
any evidence. 
Appellant's position seems to be that if a party by 
opinion evidence says that the damage was a specified 
amount that the court or jury must accept this amount 
and no other as the actual damage. Under such a concept 
the court and jury would be precluded from taking into 
consideration the credibility of witnesses, the interest 
the witness may have in the case (an element we certainly 
have in abundance in this case) and all other factors 
which make the court or the jury the sole determiners 
of damage suffered. 
The finding of the court indicates that he placed no 
credence in the testimony of the appellant. The appellant 
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had asked the sum of $680.00 as rental for 39 days for 
a saw which had cost him $659.00 (R. p. 52). The testi-
mony is undisputed that the saw was used on two week-
ends (R. page 56). The court found the reasonable rental 
for the saw was $100.00. 
It is conceded that the appellee expected to pay a 
reasonable rental but it is slibmitted that for him to pay 
an amount for rental in excess of the value of the saw 
new is out of all reason. 
This court has spoken on this phase of the law and 
along with practically every other jurisdiction has held 
that opinion evidence is not binding on a court or jury 
on the question of damages. In the case of Hirabelli vs. 
Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172, our court says the fol-
lowing: 
"The testimony of the doctor that $50.00 was 
reasonable was not binding on the jury. From the 
character and extent of the injury, and from all 
that the doctor did or was required to do in at-
tendance upon the plaintiff, as was fully disclosed 
by the evidence and from the facts thus before 
them upon which the doctor's opinion or conclu-
sion was based, the jury could justly reach the 
conclusion that $22, $2 more than was originally 
averred by him, was reasonable compensation 
for such service." 
The court then cites the case of Head vs. Hargrave, 
105 U.S. 45, 26 L. Ed. 1028. In this case the Supreme 
Court of the United States says the foilowing relative 
to the question here under consideration : 
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"To direct them (the jury) to find the value 
of the services from the testimony of the experts 
alone was to say to them that the issue should be 
detennined by the opinions of the attorneys, and 
not by the exercise of their own judgrnent of the 
facts on which those opinions were given. The 
evidence of experts as to the value of profes-
sional services does not differ in principal from 
such evidence as to the value of labor in other 
departments of business, or as to the value of 
property. So far from laying aside their own 
general knowledge and ideas, the jury should have 
applied that knowledge and those ideas to the 
matters of fact in evidence in determining the 
weight to be given to the opinions expressed; and 
it was only in that way that they could arrive at 
a just conclusion." 
The holding in the case of Head vs. Hargrave, supra, 
was followed and cited with approval by the 'Supreme 
Court of the United States in the case of The Conqueror, 
166 U.S. 110, 41 L. Ed. 937. In this case the owner of the 
vessel was suing the United States for demurrage. He 
produced experts to testify as to a proper allowance. 
These experts offered the only testimony on the subject. 
At page 943 of the L. Ed. the court said the following: 
"The amount of demurrage allowed, too, was 
so great as, if not to shock the conscience, at least 
to induce the belief that it must have been esti-
mated by witnesses who were most friendly to the 
owner. The yacht cost originally $75,000. The 
proposition that her use for a little more than five 
months, during the autumn and winter, should be 
worth to her owner $15,000 over and above all her 
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expenses, for which a separate allowance was 
made, is putting a strain upon our credulity which 
we find ourselves quite unable to bear. The truth 
is, that estimates of value made by friendly wit-
nesses, with no practical illustrations to support 
them, are, as observed by the various courts 
through which the case of Sturgis vs. Clough, 68 
U.S. 1 Wall 269 (17 :58), passed too unsafe, as a 
rule, to 'be made the basis of a judicial award, un-
less it be shown with much greater certainty that 
it is in this case, either that the vessel was earning 
profits, or that she belonged to a class of vessels 
for which there was a steady demand in the mar-
ket. We think the testimony upon the subject of 
de1nurrage in this case should have been held 
insufficient." 
The law governing the point under consideration is 
stated unequivoca'bly as follows in 20 Am. J ur. at pages 
1059 and 1060. 
"Section 1208. There is, generally speaking, 
no rule of law which requires controlling effect 
or influence to be given to, and the court and 
jury are not required to accept in the place of 
their own judgments, the opinion testimony of 
expert witnesses merely because of the special 
knowledge of the witnesses concerning the matters 
upon which they give their testimony. Expert 
opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense 
that they must be accepted as true on the subject 
of their testimony, but are generally regarded as 
purely advisory in character ; the jury may place 
whatever weight they choose upon such testimony 
and may reject it, if they find that it is inconsist-
ent with the facts in the case or otherwise un-
reasonable." 
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There are numerous citations supporting this state-
ment of the law a::; set forth in the text. Boston Insur-
ance Co. cs. Read, ( C.C.A. lOth Okla.) 166 F. (2d) 551; 
Richard & Gilbert Co. l'S. Northwestern Natural Gas 
Corp., 16 \Yash. (2d) 631, 134 P. (2d) 444. The rental 
which the appellant is trying to exact from the appellee 
is on its face unreasonable and his testimony certainly 
is self serving and because of his interest in the case, is 
entitled to no consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that in this case, under the law in 
this State, the court was not bound to find as damages 
the value stated by the appellant but could take in con-
sideration all of the facts surrounding the transaction 
and upon the basis of the cost of the saw and the time 
it was used, place a value for reasonable rental. 
The judgment of the court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & WARNOCK 
NED WARNOCK, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
1320 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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